Cobalt Strike Capabilities Mapped to TLCTC Framework
Comprehensive Implementation Guide — TLCTC v2.0 Aligned. Updated December 2025 (Revised with R-CRED and R-EXEC corrections).
BK
Bernhard Kreinz
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Abstract
This document maps Cobalt Strike features and techniques to the primary TLCTC cluster representing the generic vulnerability exploited at the initiation of that specific action. Classification follows TLCTC v2.0 normative rules (R-ROLE, R-CRED, R-EXEC, R-ABUSE). This update corrects credential dumping classifications per R-CRED (acquisition ≠ application) and adds explicit #7 recording per R-EXEC for LOLBAS-style execution patterns.
Introduction & Methodology
Cobalt Strike is heavily reliant on sequences. Many actions require prerequisites (e.g., credentials from #4, existing access via #7) and enable subsequent actions.
R-CRED Application: Credential acquisition maps to the enabling cluster; credential application (use/presentation) maps to #4. Dumping credentials is acquisition via #7 (FEC execution); using them is #4.
R-EXEC Application: Whenever FEC executes, #7 must be recorded. LOLBAS invocation (#1) followed by attacker command execution = #1 → #7.
Data Risk Events: The Data Risk Event column indicates potential direct consequences (LoC = Loss of Confidentiality, LoI = Loss of Integrity, LoA = Loss of Availability) resulting from the action, distinct from the threat cluster itself.
V2.0 Revision Note
This update corrects credential dumping classifications per R-CRED (acquisition ≠ application) and adds explicit #7 recording per R-EXEC for LOLBAS-style execution patterns.
Reconnaissance & Staging
Capability
Cluster
Generic Vulnerability
Context/Sequence
Data Risk
System Profiler (Pre-Compromise)
N/A
Reconnaissance tool
Gathers client info to inform attacks. Not a threat itself, enables #3/#9.
N/A
System Profiler (Post-Compromise)
#1
Legitimate system/browser APIs for information query
Initiated via Beacon (#7), uses legitimate APIs (#1) to gather system details.
LoC
Clone a Site
N/A
Support tool for #9
Creates replica sites for Social Engineering. Can host exploits (#3) or keyloggers (#7 via #1).
(LoC)
Host File
N/A
Support tool
Hosts files for delivery via other clusters.
N/A
Initial Access & Delivery
Capability
Cluster
Generic Vulnerability
Context/Sequence
Data Risk
Spear Phishing Tool
#9
Humans can be influenced into unsafe actions or decisions.
Crafts/sends emails to manipulate users. Leads to #3, #4, #7.
N/A
HTML Application / MS Office Macro
#7
Environment's designed capability to execute scripts/macros
Generates HTA/Macro (#7 artifact). Delivery usually via #9. User interaction enables execution.
→ #7
Payload Generator
N/A
Tool feature
Creates malware (#7) or exploit code (#2/#3) artifacts for delivery.
N/A
Client-Side Exploits
#3
Exploitable flaws in client-side software source code
Delivers/triggers exploits targeting client software. Usually requires #9 lure. Successful exploit leads to #7.
→ #7
Beacon C2 & Core Operations
Capability
Cluster
Generic Vulnerability
Context/Sequence
Data Risk
Beacon Payload Execution
#7
Environment's designed capability to execute foreign code/binaries
The running Beacon agent. Its presence signifies successful exploitation of #7 vulnerability.
Enables C2
Beacon C2 Communication
#7
Malware requiring C2 communication
The inherent command/control function of running malware (#7). Uses various protocols.
N/A
Inline Execute (BOF)
#7
Environment's designed capability to execute code within a process
Executes compiled C code (BOF) within the running Beacon (#7) process.
Enables actions
Internal Commands (sleep, checkin, mode)
#7
Malware requiring C2 commands
Commands controlling state/behavior of the running malware agent (#7).
N/A
Credential Access & Theft
CORRECTED per R-CRED: Credential acquisition (dumping, capture) maps to the enabling cluster. Credential application (use, presentation) maps to #4. This section distinguishes acquisition vs. application.
Capability
Cluster
Generic Vulnerability
Context/Sequence
Data Risk
Hashdump / LogonPasswords
#7
FEC execution to extract OS-stored credentials (acquisition)
Beacon runs FEC to dump credentials. Requires privileges. Acquisition, not application.
LoC
Mimikatz (Credential Dumping)
#7
FEC execution via Mimikatz to dump credentials from memory (acquisition)
Runs Mimikatz code (FEC) to dump credentials from memory or abuse auth features. Acquisition step.
Manipulating/using Kerberos tickets affects authentication state. Ticket USE is application.
Enables Impersonation
Keystroke Logging
#1
Legitimate OS input monitoring APIs
Injects code (via #1 or #7) that abuses legitimate OS APIs (#1) to capture keystrokes. Credential acquisition.
LoC
Screenshotting
#1
Legitimate OS display capture APIs
Injects code (via #1 or #7) that abuses legitimate OS APIs (#1) to capture screen content.
LoC
Execution & Injection
CORRECTED per R-EXEC: LOLBAS-style execution must record #7 when attacker-controlled commands execute. Invocation of legitimate binary is #1; execution of attacker content is #7. Sequence: #1 → #7.
Capability
Cluster
Generic Vulnerability
Context/Sequence
Data Risk
shell / run / execute
#1 → #7
Legitimate OS command execution → FEC execution
Uses cmd.exe or CreateProcess (#1) to run attacker commands (#7). Both must be recorded.
Enables actions
powershell / powerpick
#1 → #7
Legitimate PowerShell engine → FEC execution
Leverages PowerShell engine (#1) to execute attacker scripts/commands (#7).
Enables actions
psinject
#1 → #7
Legitimate OS process APIs + PowerShell → FEC
Injects into process (#1) then uses PowerShell to execute attacker content (#7).
Enables actions
execute-assembly
#7
Environment's designed capability to execute foreign code (.NET)
Leverages .NET runtime (#7) to load and run assemblies. Direct FEC execution.
Enables actions
dllinject / shinject / shspawn
#1 → #7
Legitimate OS process APIs → shellcode/DLL execution
Uses OS APIs (#1) to inject shellcode/DLL (#7) into remote/new process.
→ #7
dllload
#1 → #7
Legitimate OS DLL loading APIs → foreign DLL execution
Uses OS APIs (#1) to force loading of attacker DLL (#7) from disk.
Uses stolen hashes/tickets (#4) to authenticate for lateral movement. This is credential APPLICATION.
→ compromise
SMB/TCP Beacon Peer-to-Peer (link, unlink)
#7
Malware requiring C2 communication
Establishes internal C2 channels for Beacon (#7) using legitimate protocols.
N/A (Internal C2)
Collection & Exfiltration
Capability
Cluster
Generic Vulnerability
Context/Sequence
Data Risk
File Download (download)
#1
Legitimate file system access APIs & network protocols
Reads files via OS APIs (#1), transfers over C2 (#7).
LoC
Pivoting
Capability
Cluster
Generic Vulnerability
Context/Sequence
Data Risk
SOCKS Proxy / Reverse Port Forward
#1
Legitimate networking capabilities (sockets, port binding)
Uses Beacon (#7) to manipulate host's networking stack via OS APIs (#1) to relay traffic.
Enables access
Browser Pivoting
#1
Legitimate browser process APIs & IPC
Injects code (via #1 or #7) which abuses browser IPC/APIs (#1) to leverage existing web sessions.
LoC, LoI
Covert VPN
#1
Legitimate network interface/tunneling APIs
Uses Beacon (#7) to interact with OS networking APIs (#1) to create tunnel interface.
Enables access
Conclusion
This detailed mapping reinforces that Cobalt Strike's power comes from its ability to seamlessly combine techniques across multiple TLCTC clusters, executing complex attack sequences.
Understanding these sequences and the generic vulnerabilities exploited at each step is essential for effective defense. Control strategies should address the full attack path, not just individual techniques.
Key V2.0 Corrections Applied
Credential Dumping (R-CRED): Hashdump, LogonPasswords, Mimikatz credential dumping reclassified from #4 to #7 — these are credential acquisition via FEC execution, not credential application.
DCSync (R-CRED): Reclassified from #4 to #1 — DCSync abuses legitimate domain replication protocol without requiring FEC for the replication itself.
LOLBAS Execution (R-EXEC): shell/run/execute, powershell/powerpick, psinject changed from #1 to #1 → #7 — legitimate binary invocation plus FEC execution must both be recorded.
Token/Ticket USE (R-CRED): Correctly remains #4 — steal_token, make_token, Kerberos ticket use are credential APPLICATION (presenting identity artifacts).
Keystroke Logging: Correctly #1 — abuses legitimate OS APIs; captured credentials would be used in a subsequent #4 step.
Framework Reference: TLCTC v2.0 White Paper — tlctc.net
Classification Rules Applied: R-ROLE, R-CRED, R-EXEC, R-ABUSE, R-FLOOD, R-MITM, R-SUPPLY
References
Cobalt Strike Manual (Help Systems)
Kreinz, B. Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters (TLCTC), White Paper V2.0