ENISA Threat Landscape 2025
Cause-based classification of the 4,875 incidents in ETL 2025 (July 2024 – June 2025)
Updated November 3, 2026 (from the December 2025 original on TLCTC v2.0). Cluster descriptions, attack paths and velocity classes now follow TLCTC v2.7. Every figure was re-checked against ETL 2025 (v1.3); figures that the report does not contain were removed. The cluster scores remain an editorial estimate, not an ENISA statistic. The 2026 edition is analysed in ENISA Threat Landscape 2026: Counting Incidents Without a Cause.
The ReportTLCTC Cluster Threat Intensity
Editorial score (0–10): how prominently each cluster’s generic vulnerability features in ETL 2025. An estimate, not an ENISA figure.
Cluster Prevalence Ranking
Cluster Evidence from ENISA Report
Incident Distribution by Actor Type
ETL 2025: hacktivist activity represents “almost 80% of recorded incidents”; cybercrime accounts for 13.4%. The remainder (State-aligned and unattributed activity) is not broken down further here. Actor is a separate axis from the cluster (Axiom IV): the cards above show which clusters each group is reported using, not a classification by actor.
ETL 2025 groups threats into four surface categories (mobile, web, OT, supply chain; p. 9). The percentages are ENISA’s. The cluster tags show the clusters typically involved on each surface; they are this analysis, not ENISA data.
Top 5 Targeted Sectors (EU)
ENISA’s entry vectors (Fig. 1) and incident types (Fig. 2) with their TLCTC reading. A share of an entry vector is not the share of a full attack path; complete paths are shown in the strategic analysis below.
TLCTC Attack Velocity Classes
Detailed Strategic Analysis
This section provides a deconstructed analysis of specific attack scenarios and actor methodologies derived from the ENISA report.
1. Executive Summary: The Cause vs. Effect Shift
The ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 reports largely on outcomes and actors (ransomware, data breaches, hacktivism). DDoS is the exception: it already names a cause, finite capacity (#6). Through the TLCTC lens, we reframe the findings around the root causes, the generic vulnerabilities that start each chain.
The 2025 landscape is defined by a polarization of entry vectors: manipulation of people (#9, phishing in about 60% of intrusion vectors) versus rapid weaponization of implementation flaws (vulnerability exploitation, 21.3%, mostly server-side #2).
2. Expanded Attack Path Analysis (Diagrams)
Below are the precise sequences of clusters forming the complex threats described in the report.
A. The "Ransomware" Ecosystem
Ransomware is not a single cluster. It is a sequence that starts with a manipulated person or an exploited server, continues with stolen credentials and designed functions, and ends with the encryptor executing. “Ransomware” itself names the outcome: data present but unusable.
Phishing Email] -->|Lure opened| B[#7 Malware
Loader/Infostealer] B -->|Credentials stolen| C[#4 Identity Theft
Stolen creds used] C -->|Logged in| D[#1 Abuse of Functions
RDP / admin tools] D -->|Deploys| E[#7 Malware
Encryptor runs] style A fill:#3498db,stroke:#2980b9,color:white style B fill:#e74c3c,stroke:#c0392b,color:white style C fill:#f1c40f,stroke:#f39c12,color:black style D fill:#9b59b6,stroke:#8e44ad,color:white style E fill:#e74c3c,stroke:#c0392b,color:white
B. The Supply Chain / State-Nexus Path
Sophisticated actors abuse trust in third-party components to bypass perimeter defenses, often staying silent for espionage.
Compromised Update] -->|Installs| B[#7 Malware
Backdoor/Shell] B -->|Harvests keys| C[#4 Identity Theft
Admin keys used] C -->|Exfiltrates via| D[#1 Abuse of Functions
Legit Cloud Sync] style A fill:#e67e22,stroke:#d35400,color:white style B fill:#e74c3c,stroke:#c0392b,color:white style C fill:#f1c40f,stroke:#f39c12,color:black style D fill:#9b59b6,stroke:#8e44ad,color:white
C. Public Facing Exploit (The "Edge" Breach)
Critical for VPNs and Exchange servers. The attacker exploits code directly to gain a foothold.
CVE in VPN/Edge] -->|Drops| B[#7 Malware
Web Shell] B -->|Harvests creds| C[#4 Identity Theft
Service accounts used] C -->|Auths to| D[#1 Abuse of Functions
Internal Network] style A fill:#9b59b6,stroke:#8e44ad,color:white style B fill:#e74c3c,stroke:#c0392b,color:white style C fill:#f1c40f,stroke:#f39c12,color:black style D fill:#9b59b6,stroke:#8e44ad,color:white
3. Detailed Actor Data
| Actor Profile (ENISA) | Primary Objective | Preferred TLCTC Clusters | Typical Velocity (Δt) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cybercriminals | Financial Gain (Extortion) | #9 (Phish), #7 (Ransomware), #4 (Creds) | High (Automated via AI) |
| Hacktivists | Disruption / Ideology | #6 (DDoS); defacement via #2, or #4 → #1 with stolen CMS credentials | Med (Scripted Tools) |
| State-Nexus | Espionage / Pre-positioning | #10 (Supply Chain), #2 (0-Days), #1 (LotL) | Low (Stealth/Persistence) |